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Abstract
This paper provides evidence that managers adjust firm advertising, in part, to
attract investor attention and influence short-term stock returns. First, I show that
increased advertising spending is associated with a contemporaneous rise in retail buying
and abnormal stock returns, and is followed by lower future returns. Next, I document
a significant increase in advertising spending prior to insider sales, and a significant
decrease in the subsequent year. Additional analyses suggest that the inverted-V-shaped
pattern in advertising spending around insider sales is most consistent with managers’
opportunistically adjusting firm advertising to exploit the temporary return effect to
their own benefit. (JEL G12, G14)
Keywords: Advertising, Investor attention, Insider sales, Equity issues, Stock-
financed mergers and acquisitions.
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1 Introduction
Recent research has found that advertising has an important impact on the liquidity and breadth of
ownership of stocks (e.g., Grullon, Kanatas, and Weston (2004)). This is intriguing as advertising is
intended to increase the awareness of a firm’s products rather than its securities. Nevertheless, there
appears to be a spillover effect. In this paper, I start by providing evidence of this spillover effect
of advertising on stock returns. In particular, I show that an increase in advertising spending is
accompanied by a contemporaneous rise in retail buying and higher abnormal stock returns, and is
followed by lower future returns. I then ask whether firm managers are aware of this spillover effect
of product-market advertising. Evidence from insider sales, as well as seasoned equity offerings
and stock-financed acquisitions, appears consistent with the view that managers opportunistically
adjust advertising spending, in part, to influence short term stock returns.
There are good reasons to believe that advertising has a temporary stock return effect. For
example, as argued by Barber and Odean (2008), an investor has to search through thousands of
stocks when making a buy decision, but only the limited number of stocks he already holds when
making a sell decision. To the extent that attention is a scarce resource, investors are more likely
to buy attention-grabbing stocks than to sell them.1 Furthermore, since advertising is designed
to attract attention, an increase in advertising can temporarily boost firm value by generating
more buy orders than sell orders. In a related vein, while advertising almost never portrays the
underlying product or firm in a comprehensive and objective manner, investors with limited atten-
tion/processing capacity may take advertising at face value and respond overly optimistically, thus
resulting in a temporary price overshooting.2
This prediction of a spillover effect is corroborated by the data. Firms in the top decile ranked
by year-to-year changes in advertising spending outperform those in the bottom decile by 12.85%
1There is a vast empirical literature on investors’ limited attention. For an incomplete list, see Huberman and
Regev (2001); Hong, Torous, and Valkanov (2007); Hou (2007); Cohen and Frazzini (2008); DellaVigna and Pollet
(2009); Hirshleifer, Lim, and Teoh (2009). Hirshleifer (2001) provides an excellent review of this and related topics.
2This effect can be exacerbated by a recent finding that news media tend to use a more positive slant to reward
higher advertising spending (see, e.g., Gurun and Butler (2010)). If some investors are unaware of the potential
incentive problems of news agencies, they may be falsely led to bid up the stock price.
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(t=6.72) in the ranking year, and yet underperform by 6.96% (t=-3.53) and 9.84% (t=-4.52) in the
following two years, respectively. Adjusting the portfolio returns for size, value, momentum, and
liquidity factors has virtually no impact on the return pattern. In further analyses, I show that
the documented return effect is significantly stronger for firms producing consumer products, for
firms with lower analyst coverage, lower institutional ownership, and more intense retail trading,
and for firms whose brand names are more reminiscent of the firm name. These results provide
additional support for an investor-attention-based interpretation of the return pattern, and are
largely inconsistent with investment-/growth-option-based explanations.
Given that advertising can attract investor attention and impact stock returns in the short
run, I then examine whether firm managers are aware of this spillover effect, and in particular, the
extent to which managers adjust firm advertising to exploit investors’ limited attention. Anecdotal
evidence suggests that managers indeed use advertising to influence market perceptions and stock
returns. An October 2003 issue of the Wall Street Journal reports: “United Technologies Corp has
launched an advertising campaign focused on the Wall Street area and a Times Square building
looking into a Morgan Stanley trading room [...] seeks to overcome the view that it is steady, but
not a star and to correct what it believes is a 20% discount in its share price against those of peers.”
To empirically test managers’ opportunistic behavior in setting firm advertising policy, I exam-
ine variations in advertising spending in periods when stock prices matter the most. I focus on
insider equity sales in my main analysis, as insider sales are unlikely to be motivated by firms’ in-
vestment opportunities, and are thus unrelated to advertising through an investment channel. The
main prediction of the opportunistic advertising view is that there should be an inverted-V-shaped
pattern in advertising spending around periods of insider sales; that is, we should observe a sharp
increase in advertising spending before insider sales to pump up the stock price, and a significant
decrease in advertising spending in the subsequent year.
This prediction is borne out in the data. After controlling for various firm characteristics that are
known to predict insider trading, such as past stock returns and stock liquidity, advertising spending
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in the years prior, contemporaneous, and subsequent to insider sales are 5.3% (p <0.01) higher, 5.9%
(p <0.01) higher, and 5.1% (p <0.01) lower than the other years (i.e., years that are not adjacent
to insider sales), respectively. Taking the average annual advertising spending of $42 million in
my sample, these coefficients imply that firms increase their advertising spending by almost $5
million dollars in the two years leading up to insider sales. Further, a one-standard-deviation
increase in the aggregate amount of insider sales in a year is associated with a 2.01% (p <0.01)
increase in advertising spending in the contemporaneous year and a 2.76% (p <0.05) decrease in
the subsequent year. There is a similar inverted-V-shaped pattern in advertising spending around
seasoned equity offerings and stock-financed acquisitions. In contrast, there is no clear pattern in
advertising spending around debt issues or cash-financed acquisitions.
The finding that advertising spending is higher prior to but lower subsequent to insider equity
sales is potentially consistent with a market-timing view. That is, rather than opportunistically
adjust advertising to temporarily inflate stock prices shortly before planned equity sales, managers
opportunistically time their equity sales in response to planned advertising campaigns. For exam-
ple, firms may optimally choose to increase advertising spending before the launch of a new product
and consequently drive up the stock price, managers then take advantage of this advertising-induced
overvaluation by selling their equity shares. It is worth pointing out that this alternative inter-
pretation is broadly consistent with the main thesis of the paper: Managers use all levers under
their control to exploit investors’ imperfect rationality; the lever could be a particular investment
decision or the exact timing of their equity sales.
I provide a number of pieces of evidence that cut against this market timing view—i.e., increased
advertising triggers insider sales. First, instead of examining the actual selling by top managers, I
use vesting schedules of restricted equity holdings as an instrument for insider sales. Since vesting
schedules are determined at the time of stock grants (which are usually years in advance), they are
unlikely to be influenced by future advertising spending. In addition, vesting of restricted shares
has a significant impact on insider selling decisions. Taken together, vesting of restricted shares
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represents a material, yet relatively exogenous variation in the amount of insider selling in each
period. The result from this instrument-variable approach supports the opportunistic advertising
view: Firms increase advertising spending by 5.8% (p <0.05) in years with instrumented insider
selling.
Moreover, under the opportunistic managerial behavior view, advertising spending shortly be-
fore insider sales is less motivated by sound business planning, and more by the objective to attract
investor attention. Consequently, advertising in these periods should be less effective in driving fu-
ture sales. Indeed, the correlation between changes in advertising spending and future sales growth
is significantly lower in years with insider sales than in years without insider sales; moreover, this
correlation is statistically zero for insider-selling years. This result implies that opportunistic ad-
vertising is a potentially wasteful investment (on the order of millions of dollars) from the long-run
firm value perspective, as it does not translate into higher future product sales.
Finally, I repeat the same analysis on lower-level managers, such as the chief financial officer
and chief technology officer, who are usually informed about firm operations, but have little control
over advertising spending. Consistent with the opportunistic advertising interpretation, there is
no significant pattern in advertising spending around equity sales by lower-level insiders. Overall,
the evidence presented in this paper generally supports the view that increased advertising attracts
investor attention and boosts stock returns in the short run, and that managers, who are aware of
this return pattern, opportunistically adjust advertising spending to inflate short-term stock prices
before equity sales.
2 Related Literature
The findings of this paper are closely tied to recent studies on managerial incentives to manip-
ulate market perceptions and short-term stock prices. Stein (1996) argues that in an inefficient
market, managers with a short horizon exploit investors’ imperfect rationality by catering to time-
varying investor sentiment. In a related vein, Hirshleifer and Teoh (2003) and Hirshleifer, Lim, and
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Teoh (2004) model managers’ strategic disclosure behavior in settings with attention-constrained
investors. A large volume of empirical studies subsequently confirm these predictions: Many im-
portant firm decisions, such as dividend policy, stock splits, firm name, and disclosure policy, are
at least partially motivated by short-term share price considerations.3 This paper contributes to
this fast-growing literature by providing additional evidence that managers also make important
investment decisions such as advertising, in part, to influence short-term firm value.
The results on manager behavior also complement prior literature on earnings management
around equity issuance.4 The literature documents a substantial increase in abnormal accruals
and/or a decrease in discretionary spending (e.g., R&D spending) in the few years before initial
public offerings (IPO) and seasoned equity offerings (SEO), in order to boost the offering price.5
This paper, in contrast, documents that managers increase advertising spending, potentially at the
expense of reported earnings before insider sales and other forms of equity sales, highlighting the
importance of advertising and its short-term return effect.
This paper also contributes to the vast literature on investors’ limited attention in financial
markets. Prior studies find that attention-grabbing events, such as abnormal trading volume,
extreme stock returns, index additions and deletions, crossing price limits, and media coverage can
lead to higher turnover and stock returns in the short run, but lower returns subsequently.6 The
common theme underlying these prior studies and this paper is that investors are more likely to buy
and hold stocks that have recently attracted their attention, which in turn drives up the returns of
these attention-grabbing stocks.
The return result is also related to a large literature on shareholder value creation of marketing
spending. The marketing literature, usually using high frequency (e.g., monthly) marketing spend-
3See, for example, Aboody and Kasznik (2000); Cooper, Dimitrov, and Rau (2001); Baker and Wurgler (2004a,b);
Cooper, Gulen, and Rau (2005); Baker, Greenwood, and Wurgler (2009); Polk and Sapienza (2008); Greenwood
(2009). Baker, Ruback, and Wurgler (2007) provide an excellent review of this topic.
4See, for example, Teoh, Wong, and Rao (1998); Teoh, Welch, and Wong (1998a,b); Darrough and Rangan (2005);
Graham, Harvey, and Rajgopal (2005); Roychowdhury (2006).
5In a related vein, Coles, Hertzel, and Kalpathy (2006) show that managers also manipulate earnings around stock
option reissues.
6See, for example, Gervais, Kaniel, and Mingelgrin (2001); Chen, Noronha, and Singal (2004); Seasholes and Wu
(2007); Barber and Odean (2008); Lehavy and Sloan (2008); Fang and Peress (2009); Kaniel, Li, and Starks (2010).
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ing data but focusing on a small number of industries, finds that marketing spending positively
predicts firm value in the short run.7 This positive return effect can arise both from a cash-flow
channel (i.e., an immediate sales increase) and a brand-equity channel (i.e., an unobserved effect
on long-run future sales). My paper differs from this literature in that it documents a significant
negative association between advertising and future stock returns at a yearly horizon, possibly
driven by attention-motivated trading.
The closest studies to mine are Grullon, Kanatas, and Weston (2004), Frieder and Subrah-
manyam (2005), and Chemmanur and Yan (2009). Grullon, Kanatas, and Weston (2004) and
Frieder and Subrahmanyam (2005) document that firms with larger advertising spending or higher
brand visibility have a larger investor base and higher stock liquidity.8 Chemmanur and Yan (2009),
on the other hand, provide evidence that firms of the good type signal their higher valuation be-
fore equity issuance by increasing product-market advertising and subsequently experience lower
IPO/SEO first day returns. Building upon existing evidence on the attention effect of advertising,
this paper contributes to the literature by a) documenting a temporary return effect of advertising,
and b) linking this temporary return effect to managers’ opportunistic behavior.
3 Data
3.1 Firm Characteristics
Data on firm advertising expenditures (data45), total assets (data6), sales (data12), and capital
expenditures (data128) are obtained from the Compustat annual tape for the period of 1974 to
2010. The starting year of the sample is determined by the availability of advertising spending
7See, for example, Rao and Bharadwaj (2008); Srinivasan and Hanssens (2009); Srinivasan, Pauwels, Silva-Risso,
and Hanssens (2009); Joshi and Hanssens (2010); Osinga, Leeflang, Srinivasan, and Wieringa (2011).
8In an independent study, Chemmanur and Yan (2010) report a similar return effect induced by product market
advertising. This paper differs importantly from Chemmanur and Yan (2010) in that it focuses on the link between
this return effect and managerial behavior around equity sales. An earlier paper, Fehle, Tsyplakov, and Zdorovtsov
(2005), studies the stock return pattern of firms that advertise in Super Bowl broadcasts, and finds a short-term
price appreciation that does not revert in the long run. In a more recent study, Keloharju, Knpfer, and Linnainmaa
(2011) show that individuals’ product market choices can influence their investment decisions, using data from the
automotive and brokerage industries.
6
data in Compustat. I exclude firm-year observations with missing advertising-spending information
from the sample. As a robustness check, I also treat missing advertising spending as zero and
obtain similar results.9 I then merge the Compustat sample with the CRSP monthly stock file to
obtain data on stock returns, market capitalizations, and trading volume. I further augment the
sample with quarterly institutional holdings and monthly small order imbalances, obtained from
Thomson Financial’s CDA/Spectrum database, and the Trade and Quote (TAQ) and Institute
for the Study of Security Markets (ISSM) databases, respectively. Following prior literature, I
calculate institutional ownership as the total shares held by institutional investors scaled by the
shares outstanding at the end of the previous quarter. Small orders are defined as those below
$5,000 in size, and the monthly order imbalance is constructed as the total buy orders minus sell
orders scaled by the sum of the two.
To mitigate the effect of outliers, I winsorize all change (e.g., annual growth in advertising spend-
ing) and ratio (e.g., the advertising-spending-to-sales ratio) variables at the 1st and 99th percentiles.
Table I presents the summary statistics of the sample. As shown in Panel A, the subsample of firms
with non-missing advertising spending data is similar to that with missing advertising spending
data: The former is slightly larger than the latter in terms of size and net earnings, and the two
subsamples have similar age and market-to-book ratios. The average advertising spending in my
sample is slightly over $42 million a year and account for about 4.33% of annual sales and 4.73% of
total assets. The average annual growth of advertising spending is 27.56%. These figures indicate
that advertising constitutes a non-trivial part of firms’ investment decisions.
3.2 Other Variables
3.2.1 Insider Sales
Insiders, broadly defined as directors and executives, are required to report all changes in their
company holdings to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) through Forms 3, 4, and 5.
9I also explicitly correct for the potential selection bias in missing advertising spending data using the Heckman
procedure, and obtain virtually identical results.
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Insider trading data are obtained from the Thomson Financial Insider Filing database. To ensure
data quality, I exclude all observations with a cleanse code of “A” or “S,” indicative of a failed
cleansing attempt, from the sample. I retrieve three variables from the insider-filing database:
the date of each transaction, the number of shares bought (or sold), and the price at which the
transaction took place. I further exclude observations where the transaction price is greater than
three times or less than one third of the closing price on the transaction day, as these are likely to
be data errors.
I follow the rule suggested by Thomson Financial to classify insiders into two categories based
on their role in the firm. Top-level insiders include the chairman of the board, the chief executive
officer, the chief operating officer, the general counsel, and the president. Second-tier insiders
include the vice chairman, the advisory committee, the compensation committee, the executive
committee, the finance committee, the technology committee, the chief financial officer, the chief
investment officer, the chief technology officer, the treasurer, the secretary, the beneficial owners,
and the officers of the parent company and divisional officers. For the main analysis, I focus on
top-level insiders only, who have the ultimate control over firm investment.
For each firm-year, I calculate aggregate insider sales as the total shares sold by all insiders in
the year scaled by the number of shares outstanding. I define an event year as one in which the
total amount of insider sales is above the 25th percentile of the sample distribution. The 25% cutoff
is to weed out situations where insiders sell a tiny fraction of the available shares and hence have
weak incentives to (temporarily) inflate stock prices. I obtain similar results with alternative cutoff
values (e.g., 0%, 10%, or 50%). My results are also robust to using the continuous insider-selling
variable (as shown in Panel C of Table VI and Table X).
3.2.2 Restricted Shares
To identify relatively exogenous shocks to insider selling (which hopefully are independent from
advertising spending decisions), I use vesting schedules of restricted equity holdings to instrument
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for insider selling. Firms are required to report the number of restricted shares acquired by top
managers upon vesting under FAS 123R, which came into effect in December 2004. The data on
the vesting of restricted shares owned by the top five executives are obtained from Compustat’s
Executive Compensation database, and are available for the period of 2005 to 2010.
To gain a better understanding of the vesting data, I obtain the vesting schedules for a smaller
sample of firms from Equilar for the period of 2006 to 2008. Around one third of all restricted
stock grants in this sample vest in a single year (i.e., a cliff vesting schedule). Among the remaining
two-thirds of the observations where restricted stock grants vest gradually (i.e., a graded vesting
schedule), the number of years over which these grants vest varies considerably from two to ten
years, with three and four years being the most popular choices.10 Overall, there is a significant
amount of variation in the number of shares vesting in each year.
3.2.3 Equity and Debt Issues
Public equity and debt issues for all US firms are obtained from Thomson Financial’s Securities
Data Corporation (SDC) database. For equity issues, I exclude all IPOs because the coverage
of advertising spending in pre-IPO years is incomplete in Compustat. In particular, I retrieve
from SDC the date of each public equity (debt) offering and the principal amount received. For
each firm-year, I then calculate the total equity (debt) issuance as the aggregate principal amount
received in all equity (debt) issues in that year, divided by the market capitalization of the firm.
Finally, I categorize an event year as one in which there is at least one equity (debt) issue.
3.2.4 Stock- and Cash-Financed Acquisitions
Stock- and cash-financed acquisitions are also obtained from the SDC database. I only retain
observations where it is clear that the deal is 100% financed by equity or 100% financed by cash.
I then calculate the total proceeds involved in all stock- or cash-financed acquisitions over a year
10Less than 10% of the restricted stock grants in this sample has a performance-based vesting schedule.
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as a fraction of the acquirer’s market capitalization. An event year is then defined as one in which
there is at least one stock- or cash-financed acquisition.
Panel B of Table I reports the summary statistics of these corporate events. The average size
of insider sales in a year is 1.22% of shares outstanding, with a standard deviation of 2.21%. These
figures may seem small in absolute terms, but could account for a large fraction of managers’ wealth.
The average amount of shares vesting in a year is 0.20% of shares outstanding, with a standard
deviation of 0.27%. The average proceeds received from equity and debt issues in a year account
for 17.74% and 26.47% of the firm’s market value, respectively. Finally, the total transaction values
of stock- and cash-financed acquisitions in a year are 36.07% and 12.53% of the acquirer’s market
capitalization, respectively.
4 Advertising Spending and Stock Returns
Prior research finds that product-market advertising attracts investor attention. In this section,
I extend this result by examining stock return implications of product-market advertising. In
particular, attention-constrained investors are more prone to buy attention-grabbing stocks than
to sell them. Advertising, which is designed to attract attention, can cause stock prices to tem-
porarily overshoot by generating more buy orders than sell orders. The exact prediction of this
limited-attention hypothesis is that an increase in advertising spending should be accompanied by
a contemporaneous rise in stock price, and followed by lower future stock returns.
4.1 Stock Return Results
I start by conducting a calendar-time portfolio analysis, where stocks are ranked by changes in
advertising spending in the previous year. To avoid any market microstructure issues, I follow
prior literature (e.g., Jegadeesh and Titman (2001)) to exclude stocks with a price below five
dollars a share and whose market capitalization would place it in the bottom NYSE size decile. I
also require minimum advertising spending of $100,000 a year, to mitigate the impact of outliers
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when computing changes in advertising spending. Using different cutoffs (e.g., $50,000 or $200,000)
does not affect my results.
At the end of each month, I sort all firms with non-missing advertising spending data into
decile portfolios, based on the percentage change in advertising spending. I use percentage changes
rather than dollar changes, as the marginal effect of an advertising dollar on consumer/investor
attention is likely decreasing in the total amount of adverting spending. For instance, a $1 billion
increase in advertising spending by General Motors, which already spends billions of dollars on
advertising each year, may have a small incremental effect on investor awareness, whereas a $1
million increase in advertising spending by an internet start-up may go a long way to reach out
to potential investors. The decile portfolios are then held for two years and are rebalanced each
month to maintain equal weights.
Table II reports monthly returns to these decile portfolios. As can be seen from Panel A, changes
in advertising spending in a year are significantly and positively associated with contemporaneous
stock returns. The difference in excess stock returns between the top and bottom deciles ranked
by ∆AD is 1.07% (t=6.72) per month in the portfolio formation year. There is a significant
reversal pattern in the subsequent two years. The spread in monthly returns between the top and
bottom deciles ranked by ∆AD is -58 bp (t=-3.54) and -82 bp (t=-4.52) in the following two years,
respectively. In other words, the positive return accrued to the long-short portfolio in the formation
year is completely reversed by the end of year two. Adjusting the portfolio returns by the size,
value, momentum, and liquidity factors, or by the Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers (1997)
(DGTW) characteristics-based benchmark has virtually no impact on this return pattern.
Panel B repeats the same analysis using industry-adjusted ∆AD to address the potential con-
cern that the documented return pattern is driven by industry-wide fluctuations in advertising
spending. Specifically, in each year, I subtract the industry average advertising spending growth
from individual firms’ advertising spending growth, and use this difference to sort firms into deciles.
The results are similar to those reported in Panel A. The return spread between the top and bottom
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deciles ranked by industry-adjusted ∆AD is 84 bp (t=5.74) per month in the portfolio formation
year, and is -56 bp (t=-3.53) and -88 bp (t=-5.57) per month in the subsequent two years.
As a robustness check, I divide the whole sample into two sub-periods around a regulatory
change in year 1994. The Accounting Standards Executive Committee issued Statement of Position
(SOP) 93-7—Reporting on Advertising Costs—on June 15th 1994, which changed the practices
companies followed to expense their advertising costs. As shown in Panels C and D, the return
patterns in the two sub-periods are similar to that for the full sample both in terms of economic
magnitudes and statistical significance. In sum, the results shown in Table II suggest a robust
inverted-V-shaped return pattern in periods of increased advertising spending.
To further isolate the marginal effect of advertising on future stock returns, I conduct the
following Fama-MacBeth return forecasting regression:
RETi,s = α+ β ∗ ∆ADi,t + γ ∗ Control + εi,s, (1)
where the dependent variable, RETi,s, is the monthly stock return in the subsequent period. The
independent variable of interest is the change in advertising spending in years t. I then control
for growth in total assets, sales, and capital expenditures in year t, all of which are significantly
correlated with changes in advertising spending. Additional control variables include firm size,
book-to-market ratio, past returns, equity issuance (as defined in Daniel and Titman (2006)),
turnover, and discretionary accruals (as in Xie (2001)).
The regression results are shown in Table III. The dependent variable in columns 1 and 2
is the monthly stock return in the following year. The coefficients imply that a one-standard-
deviation increase in ∆AD is associated with a 20.2 bp (p <0.01) decrease in monthly returns
in the subsequent year in a univariate regression, and a 9.3 bp (p <0.05) decrease in monthly
returns in a multi-variate regression. Columns 3 and 4 examine stock returns in year two. After
controlling for the list of known stock return predictors, a one-standard-deviation increase in ∆AD
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is associated with a a 9.3 bp (p <0.01) decrease in monthly stock returns for the second year.
Finally, the dependent variable in columns 5 and 6 is the monthly stock return in months 7 to 18
after fiscal year ends, as many firms delay their annual reporting by as much as six months. The
results are similar to those reported in columns 1 and 2.
The coefficients on the control variables are generally consistent with prior findings. For ex-
ample, both asset growth and investment growth significantly negatively predict future stock re-
turns (Cooper, Gulen, and Schill (2008), Titman, Wei, and Xie (2004)). Importantly, advertising
spending remains a statistically significant stock return predictor after controlling for these firm
characteristics. In sum, the evidence shown in this section, from both the calendar-time portfolio
analysis and the Fama-MacBeth regression approach, suggests that increased advertising is associ-
ated with a contemporaneous rise in stock returns, and followed by lower future returns. Moreover,
this inverted-V-shaped return pattern is unrelated to common risk factors and previously-known
return determinants, and is robust to alternative definitions of ∆AD and different sample periods.
4.2 Alternative Interpretations
The documented return pattern is potentially consistent with alternative interpretations, however.
For example, a signalling model may predict that, while the content of advertising is generally
uninformative about the firm’s future profitability and growth prospects, the act of advertising
itself can serve as a value-relevant signal to the market, as only firms with good future prospects
can afford to advertise.11 Therefore, increased advertising spending should naturally lead to higher
valuation. This signalling channel, while consistent with the initial stock price run-up in periods
with increased advertising, can not explain the subsequent complete return reversal.
The reversal pattern, however, can be consistent with an investment-based asset pricing model.
For example, the Q-theory predicts that a reduction in a firm’s cost of capital increases the marginal
value of its investment, which would then induce a negative correlation between investment and
11See, e.g., Nelson (1974); Grossman and Shapiro (1984); Kihlstrom and Riordan (1984); Milgrom and Roberts
(1986); Chemmanur and Yan (2009).
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future stock returns (e.g., Cochrane (1991, 1996); Zhang (2005); Liu, Whited, and Zhang (2009)).
In addition, models of growth options predict that when firms exercise their growth options, since
growth options are riskier than assets in place, these firms would have lower risk, thus lower average
returns, going forward (e.g., Berk, Green, and Naik (1999); Carlson, Fisher, and Giammarino
(2004)). I provide a number of additional tests that cut against these investment-based channels,
and that are more in favor of the limited-attention story.
4.2.1 Retail Investor Trading
Since retail investors are generally more attention and resource constrained relative to institutions,
one immediate prediction of the limited-attention story is that retail investors should be more
affected by product market advertising, and thus should be net buyers of firms with increased
advertising spending. Following prior research on retail vs. institutional trading (e.g., Barber,
Odean, and Zhu (2009) and Hvidkjaer (2008)), I label stock trading orders (from TAQ and ISSM)
that are smaller than $5,000 as the ones submitted by retail investors. This simple rule to identify
retail vs. institutional trading has been shown to be effective until early 2000, at which point the
NYSE introduced decimalization to its pricing system and institutions in response started to break
up their orders. Thus, I restrict my analysis to the pre-2000 period by conducting the following
Fama-MacBeth regression:
IMBALi,s = α+ β ∗ ∆ADi,t + γ ∗ Control + εi,s, (2)
where IMBALi,s is the monthly small-trade imbalance, defined as the number of small buy orders
minus the number of small sell orders, scaled by the total number of small orders in that month.
I also define IMBAL based on the total dollar volume of buy and sell orders. The list of controls
includes growth in firm asset, sales, and capital expenditures, past stock returns at various horizons,
firm size, book-to-market, firm age, and turnover.
In the first two columns of Table IV, the dependent variable is the monthly small-trade imbalance
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in the year during which we measure changes in advertising spending. The result confirms that
retail investors are significant net buyers of firms that increase their advertising spending. After
controlling for other confounding factors, a one-standard-deviation increase in advertising spending
is associated with a 3.4% (p <0.01) increase in monthly small-trade imbalance in the same year.
There also appears to be an attention spillover effect to the following year. As shown in columns
3 and 4, where the dependent variable is the monthly small-trade imbalance in year t+1, a one-
standard-deviation increase in advertising spending is associated with a 1.7% (p <0.1) increase in
monthly small-trade imbalance.
The next four columns repeat the same analysis except that now small-trade imbalance is
calculated based on the dollar value rather than the number of small buy/sell orders. The results
are virtually identical to those reported in columns 1 through 4. In sum, the results shown in Table
IV suggest that product-market advertising indeed has a strong impact on retail investors’ buying
behavior, consistent with the view that retail investors are generally more attention constrained
than their institutional peers.
4.2.2 The Mechanism
To further distinguish the limited-attention story from alternative interpretations, I exploit cross-
sectional variations in the effect of advertising on investor attention. Specifically, I introduce an
additional interaction term to equation (1):
RETi,s = α+ β1 ∗ ∆ADi,t + β2 ∗ ∆ADi,t ∗ INDi,t + β3 ∗ INDi,t + γ ∗ Control + εi,s, (3)
where IND is a binary variable whose value depends on various firm characteristics. A positive
(negative) coefficient on the interaction term then indicates a weaker (stronger) temporary return
effect of advertising for firms with an IND score of one relative to firms with a score of zero.
The first set of firm characteristics I consider aims to capture the salience of advertising to
investors. Since advertising for consumer products (e.g., the iPhone) is more attention-grabbing
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than advertising for industrial products (e.g., silicon plates), the return effect of advertising should
be stronger for firms in consumer-product industries than in other industries. In a similar vein, the
return effect should also be stronger for firms with lower analyst coverage, as investors in these firms
have fewer alternative information sources and may have to rely on advertising as an information
source.
The results are consistent with both predictions. As shown in columns 1 and 2 of Table V,
the coefficient on the interaction term between ∆AD and a dummy that equals one for firms
in consumer-product industries and zero otherwise is -0.18 (p <0.05), and the coefficient on the
interaction term between ∆AD and a dummy that equals one if the firm is above the median
analyst coverage (adjusted for firm size) is 0.21 (p <0.01). In other words, advertising has a much
stronger temporary return effect for firms in consumer-product industries and for those with lower
analyst coverage.
The second set of firm characteristics reflects institutional vs. retail demand. Since retail in-
vestors are more likely to be drawn to firms with increased advertising, we expect the return reversal
pattern to be stronger when there is more retail buying (or simply share turnover) contempora-
neous to increased advertising. Similarly, the return effect should also be stronger for firms with
higher retail ownership, as these stocks are the preferred habitat of retail investors. The results
shown in columns 3 to 5 support these predictions. The temporary return effect of advertising is
indeed stronger for firms experiencing more intense retail buying (or higher share turnover) in the
year contemporaneous to increased advertising, as well as for firms with larger retail ownership at
the beginning of that year.
The third and final set of firm characteristics aims to measure the similarity between product
brand names and the firm name. In particular, the closer the two names, the easier investors
can associate product-market advertising to the underlying firm. A direct measure of the similarity
between product names and the firm name, however, requires considerable discretion. Consider, for
example, Microsoft (the firm) and MSN (the brand), where MSN is an abbreviation for Microsoft
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Network. It is unclear whether investors would immediately think of Microsoft when they see
MSN. To get around this issue, I proxy for this similarity using the number of product brands each
firm has, as reported by Nielson Media, for the period of 2004-2010. The underlying premise is
that firms with a larger number of products usually have a distinct brand name for each individual
product, which tends to be also distinct from the firm name. For example, Procter & Gamble, which
operates in more than 10 consumer product markets and has over 100 products, has a unique brand
for each of its products (e.g., Crest toothpaste, Cover Girl makeup, Dawn dishwashing detergent,
etc.), none of which bears any resemblance to the company name.
The evidence presented in column 6 of Table V supports this prediction. The return effect of
advertising is significantly weaker for firms with a larger number of product brands (adjusted for
firm size). Together, these additional analyses on the underlying mechanism lend further support to
the limited-attention interpretation of the documented return pattern, and are incompatible with
the alternative, investment-based channels.
5 Advertising Spending around Equity Sales
If product-market advertising can attract investor attention and temporarily boost stock returns,
a natural question to ask is whether firm managers are aware of this temporary return effect,
and more important, the extent to which managers adjust firm advertising to exploit investors’
bounded rationality. To empirically test managers’ opportunistic behavior, I examine variations
in advertising spending in periods when short-term stock prices matter the most. I focus on
periods of insider equity sales in my main analysis, as insider selling is unlikely to be motivated by
firm’s investment opportunities, and thus does not correlate with advertising spending through an
investment channel. The main prediction of the opportunistic managerial behavior hypothesis is
that we should observe an inverted-V-shaped pattern in advertising spending around insider sales;
in particular, we should see a sharp increase in advertising spending before insider sales to pump
up the stock price, and a significant decrease in advertising spending in the subsequent year.
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5.1 Advertising Spending around Insider Selling
In each fiscal year, I compute the aggregate amount of insider equity sales as the total number of
shares sold by all top executives divided by the number of shares outstanding at the end of the
previous year. The list of top executives, as defined by Thomson Financial, includes the chairman
of the board, the chief executive officer, the chief operating officer, the general counsel, and the
president. I then define an event year as one in which the amount of insider sales is above the 25th
percentile of the sample distribution. The 25% threshold is imposed to weed out situations where
managers sell a tiny fraction of the shares available and thus do not have a strong incentive to
(temporarily) inflate stock prices. My results are by and large unchanged if I instead use 0%, 10%,
or 50% as the cutoff. Specifically, I conduct the following pooled OLS regression with firm-year
observations:
ADi,t = α+ β1 ∗ PreEventi,t + β2 ∗ Eventi,t + β3 ∗ PostEventi,t + γ ∗ Control + εi,t, (4)
where the dependent variable is the logarithm of advertising spending in year t.12 Among the
list of independent variables, Eventt is an indicator function that equals one if year t is an event
year, and zero otherwise. For all non-event years, PreEventt is set to one if t+1 is an event
year, and PostEventt is set to one if t-1 is an event year, and zero otherwise. If both PreEventt
and PostEventt are equal to one (i.e., the following and previous years are both event years), both
dummies are reset to zero, as the prediction on advertising spending in year t is unclear in this case.
Thus, the coefficients on these binary variables, PreEventt, Eventt, and PostEventt, indicate the
extent to which managers adjust advertising spending in the years prior, contemporaneous, and
subsequent to insider sales relative to all other years (i.e., years not adjacent to insider sales),
respectively.
I control for past stock returns and share turnover measured over various horizons to address
12For robustness checks, I also use industry-adjusted advertising spending as the dependent variable and obtain
similar results.
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the concern that advertising spending and insider sales may be jointly determined by firms’ past
performance and stock liquidity. Other control variables include lagged firm assets, sales, market
capitalization, book-to-market ratio, firm age, return volatility, and the Kaplan and Zingales (1997)
index of financial constraints. I also include year-fixed effects in all regressions to subsume market-
wide fluctuations in advertising spending and insider selling.
The regression results are reported in Panel A of Table VI. There is a clear inverted-V-shaped
pattern in advertising spending around insider selling. As shown in column 1, where I also control
for lagged adverting spending, the average advertising spending in the years prior, contemporane-
ous, and subsequent to insider sales is 5.3% (p <0.01) higher, 6.9% (p <0.01) higher, and 3.9%
(p <0.01) lower than that in other years, respectively. Taking the mean (median) annual advertising
spending of $42 ($2.2) million in my sample, these coefficients imply that firms in the years prior,
contemporaneous, and subsequent to insider sales spend $2.2 ($0.12) million more, $2.9 ($0.15)
million more, and $1.6 ($0.09) million less on advertising relative to other years, respectively. The
coefficients on the control variables are similar to those in prior literature. For example, advertising
spending is highly persistent over time and is significantly correlated with firm sales and assets.
Column 2 conducts a similar regression analysis, except that now I include firm-fixed effects,
rather than lagged advertising spending, in the regression. This is to control for unobserved, but
time-invariant firm characteristics that can drive both advertising spending and insider sales. The
result is virtually identical to that presented in column 1. The average advertising spending in
the years prior, contemporaneous, and subsequent to insider sales is 5.3% (p <0.01) higher, 5.9%
(p <0.01) higher, and 5.1% (p <0.01) lower than that in the other years. Column 3 uses a scaled
version of advertising spending—i.e., advertising spending divided by lagged firm sales—as the
dependent variable. The results are by and large unchanged. The average advertising-spending-to-
sales ratio in the years prior, contemporaneous, and subsequent to insider sales is 4.9% (p <0.01)
higher, 5.9% (p <0.01) higher, and 4.9% (p <0.01) lower than that in the remaining years.
As a robustness check, and to address the concern that advertising spending may have a non-
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linear relation with some of the control variables, I also conduct a matched-sample analysis. In
particular, the treatment group includes firm-year observations where year t (the year in question)
is an event year and none of the surrounding four years (i.e., t-2, t-1, t+1, and t+2) is an event year.
I then construct a potential matching sample that includes all firm-year observations where both
year t and the surrounding four years are non-event years. For each observation in the treatment
sample, I then identify a matching firm (with replacement) as the one with the closet propensity
score based on a set of firm characteristics: industry, firm size, the book-to-market ratio, and past
stock returns. My results are also robust to using the average of the closet three or five matching
firms.
There are in total 1,041 firm-year observations in the treatment sample with valid matching
firms. I then calculate the differences in advertising spending between year t and the four adjacent
years for both the treatment sample and the matching sample. I then report the difference in
difference between the two samples in Panel B of Table VI. As shown in column 2, relative to the
matching sample, the average advertising spending in year t of an event firm is 6.28% (p <0.05),
2.59% (p <0.1), 4.38% (p <0.05), and 9.83% (p <0.01) higher than that in years t-2, t-1, t+1, and
t+2, respectively. In other words, there is a significant increase in advertising spending in the two
years before insider selling, and a significant decrease in advertising spending in the two years after.
Moreover, if managers opportunistically adjust advertising to temporarily inflate stock prices
in order to maximize the proceeds from equity sales, we expect the inverted-V-shaped pattern
in advertising spending to be more pronounced when there is a larger amount of insider selling.
This prediction is borne out in the data. Panel C reports the same regression analysis as in Panel
A except that now I include three additional independent variables in the regression: the actual
amount of insider selling in the following, present, and previous years. For example, the coefficients
in column 2 (which also includes firm-fixed effects) imply that a one-standard-deviation increase
in the aggregate amount of insider sales in a year is associated with a 2.01% (p <0.01) increase in
advertising spending in the same year and a 2.76% (p <0.05) decrease in advertising spending in
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the subsequent year.
5.2 The Market-Timing View
The pattern that advertising spending is higher prior to but lower subsequent to insider equity
sales is potentially consistent with an alternative, market-timing view. Market timing refers to
the practice of selling securities at abnormally high prices and buying securities at abnormally
low prices. So, rather than opportunistically adjust advertising to temporarily inflate stock prices
around planned equity sales, managers may opportunistically time their equity sales in response to
planned advertising campaigns. In particular, as investors are attracted to increased advertising
and thus push up the stock price, managers may then sell their stakes to take advantage of this
advertising-induced overvaluation. It is worth pointing out, however, that this alternative market-
timing interpretation is broadly consistent with the main thesis of the paper: Managers use all
levers under their control to exploit investors’ bounded rationality; the lever could be a particular
investment decision or the exact timing of their equity sales. Nonetheless, I provide a number of
additional pieces of evidence that cut against this market-timing interpretation, and that are more
in favor of the opportunistic advertising view.
5.2.1 An Instrument-Variable Approach: Restricted Shares Vesting
The cleanest way to separate the opportunistic advertising view from opportunistic trading is to
identify exogenous shocks to insider selling decisions; in other words, we need to identify pre-planned
equity sales. To this end, I exploit variations in the number of restricted shares that vest in each
year. First, top executives tend to sell a significant fraction of their restricted equity holdings as
soon as these shares vest.13 Second, vesting schedules are determined at the time of the stock
grants, which are usually a few years in advance; it is thus unlikely that advertising spending years
down the road can influence vesting schedules that were set up in the past. Consequently, vesting
13Huddart and Lang (1996) and Fu and Ligon (2010) show that top executives exercise a significant fraction of
their stock options upon vesting.
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schedules of restricted shares represent a material and relatively exogenous variation in insider
selling decisions in each period.
I compute the aggregate amount of restricted shares vesting in each year as the total number
of shares acquired by the top five executives due to vesting, divided by the number of shares
outstanding at the end of the previous year. I choose to focus on restricted stock shares rather
than restricted incentive stock options, because of the tax code associated with incentive options. In
particular, the gains from exercising incentive options are taxed as personal income if the acquired
shares are sold immediately, but are taxed as long-term capital gains if the shares are sold one
year after option exercising. If managers do not sell their acquired shares immediately after option
exercising to save on tax, they then have little incentive to inflate stock prices at the time of option
exercising or vesting. There is, however, no such differential tax treatment for selling restricted
shares.
The regression results for the instrument-variable analysis are reported in Table VII. The first
two columns repeat the baseline OLS regression (same as Panel A of Table VI) on the subsample
of firms with available vesting data. In this subsample, firms increase their advertising spending
by 4.8% in years with insider selling, similar to the result in the full sample. Column 3 shows the
first-stage IV regression. Consistent with the idea that insiders sell some of their restricted holdings
upon vesting, there is a significant correlation between restricted shares vesting in a year and the
actual selling by top executives in the same period. In columns 4 and 5, I repeat the same analysis
as in columns 1 and 2, except that now the main independent variable is the instrumented insider
sales from the first-stage regression. The coefficient on the instrumented event dummy of 5.8% is
similar in magnitude to that reported in columns 1 and 2. In sum, the evidence shown in Table VII
suggests a similar pattern in advertising spending around pre-planned equity sales, lending support
to the opportunistic advertising interpretation.
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5.2.2 The Sensitivity of Future Sales to Advertising Spending
If managers indeed opportunistically adjust advertising spending to pump up the stock price before
insider sales, we expect to see a weaker correlation between advertising spending and future sales
growth in periods of insider sales than in other years. First, advertising in these periods is likely to
be driven by insiders’ needs to liquidate their shares, rather than firms’ investment opportunities,
the latter of which are usually associated with higher future sales growth. In addition, advertising
around insider sales is more about attracting stock-market investors and less about attracting
product-market consumers—the anecdote of United Technologies Corp is a perfect example for
this; thus, advertising in these periods should be less effective in driving future sales.
To test this idea, I conduct a simple regression analysis where the dependent variable is sales
growth in a year and the main independent variable is the change in advertising spending in the
previous year. I also include an interaction term between lagged changes in advertising spending and
an event dummy that equals one if there is some insider selling in the same year. The prediction is
that we should see a positive coefficient on lagged changes in advertising spending and a significantly
negative coefficient on this interaction term.
As shown in Table VIII, ∆AD significantly and positively predicts future sales growth in periods
without insider sales, and this predictability drops significantly in periods with insider sales. For
example, the coefficients in column 4 imply that a one-standard-deviation increase in ∆AD is
associated with a 2.7% (p <0.01) increase in firm sales in the subsample where the event dummy is
zero, and is associated with a 1.6% (insignificant) decrease in firm sales in the subsample where the
event dummy is equal to one. This difference of 4.3% between the two subsamples is statistically
significant at the 1% level. The same result is also presented graphically in Figure 1.
This pattern of sales growth also suggests that opportunistic advertising around insider sales
imposes a non-trivial cost on shareholders, as higher advertising spending in these periods does not
translate into higher future product sales. I explore how corporate governance may mitigate this
agency issue in Section 5.2.4.
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5.2.3 Lower-Level Insiders
Another way to differentiate between the opportunistic advertising and opportunistic trading views
is to focus on executives that are informed about firm operations (so that they can time their equity
sales), but have little control over investment decisions, such as advertising. For this purpose, I
repeat the same set of analyses, but focusing on equity sales by lower-level insiders. To alleviate
any concern of data mining, I use the definition of second-tier insiders provided by Thomson
Financial, which includes the vice chairman, the advisory committee, the compensation committee,
the executive committee, the finance committee, the technology committee, the chief financial
officer, the chief investment officer, the chief technology officer, the treasurer, the secretary, the
beneficial owners, and the officers of the parent company and divisional officers.
As shown in Table IX, there is no significant pattern in advertising spending around equity sales
by lower-level insiders. The coefficient estimates on the pre-event, event, and post-event dummies
are only one third of those based on top-level insiders (Table VI), and none of these coefficients are
statistically significant.
5.2.4 Operation Complexity and Corporate Governance
The opportunistic advertising interpretation has two additional predictions. First, the documented
inverted-V-shaped pattern in advertising spending around insider sales should be more pronounced
when top managers have more direct control over detailed investment decisions. In particular, as
for conglomerate firms, it is usually the divisional managers rather than headquarter managers who
have the ultimate control over the exact timing and intensity of advertising. Thus, we should see
more opportunistic advertising by top executives in firms with a simpler structure—i.e., stand-alone
firms—than for firms that operate in multiple industry segments. In untabulated results, I show
that relative to conglomerate firms, stand-alone firms increase their advertising spending by 5.9%
(p <0.05) more in years of insider sales.
Second, as already alluded to in the sales growth test, managers’ opportunistic advertising
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before own equity sales reflects a conflict of interest between top executives and their shareholders.
To the extent that corporate governance can help alleviate agency issues, we expect managerial
opportunistic behavior to decrease in corporate governance. To test this idea, I construct a binary
dictator variable that equals one if the governance index of Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) is
above 12 and zero otherwise.14 In untabulated results, I find that dictatorship firms increase their
advertising spending by 25.5% (p <0.1) more than non-dictatorship firms in years of insider selling.
5.3 Advertising Spending around Other Forms of Equity Sales
If managers are aware of the temporary return effect of advertising and opportunistically adjust
advertising to take advantage of it, we should expect a similar inverted-V-shaped pattern in adver-
tising spending around other types of equity sales. In this section, I examine two additional forms
of equity sales: seasoned equity offerings and stock-financed acquisitions. Each year, I calculate
the aggregate amount of equity issues as the total proceeds from all seasoned equity offerings in
the year scaled by the firm’s market capitalization at the end of the previous year. An event year
is then defined as having at least one seasoned equity offering.
The results are shown in Panel A of Table X. The average advertising spending in the years
prior, contemporaneous, and subsequent to equity issues is 3.8% (p <0.01), 7.7% (p <0.01), and
0.8% (insignificant) higher than that in other years, respectively. Taking the mean (median) annual
advertising spending of $42 ($2.2) million in my sample, these coefficients imply that firms in the
years prior and contemporaneous to seasoned equity offerings spend $1.6 ($0.08) million and $3.2
($0.17) million more on advertising than other years. In addition, a one-standard-deviation increase
in the aggregate amount of equity issues in a year is associated with a 3.66% (p <0.01) increase in
advertising spending in the prior year, a 5.89% (p <0.01) increase in the contemporaneous year,
and a 2.86% (p <0.1) decrease in the subsequent year. In contrast, there is no clear pattern in
advertising spending around debt issues (columns 3 and 4), suggesting that the advertising pattern
14Around 7% of the sample is classified as dictatorship firms.
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around equity issues is unlikely to be driven by firms’ funding needs for investment purposes.
In Panel B, I examine variations in advertising spending around stock-financed acquisitions,
where an event year is defined as having at least one 100%-stock-financed acquisition. The average
advertising spending by the acquirer in the year contemporaneous to stock-financed acquisitions
is 14.0% (p <0.01) higher than that in other years. Further, a one-standard-deviation increase in
the aggregate transaction value of all acquisitions in a year is associated with a 4.76% (p <0.05)
increase in advertising spending in the same period. Again, in a placebo test, I find no similar
pattern in advertising spending around cash-financed acquisitions (columns 3 and 4). In sum, the
results shown in Table X suggest that the inverted-V-shaped advertising pattern around equity
sales is a robust phenomenon, which is unlikely to be explained by an investment channel.
6 Conclusion
This paper contributes to the fast-growing literature on managers’ short-termist behavior by pro-
viding evidence that managers opportunistically adjust advertising spending to pump up the stock
price before selling their own shares. I start by documenting a significant spillover effect of product-
market advertising on stock market returns; there is a significant rise in stock price contemporaneous
to increased advertising, which is then reversed in the following years. I then examine the extent to
which managers opportunistically adjust advertising to exploit its temporary return effect. There is
a sharp increase in advertising spending shortly before insider sales, and a significant decrease in the
following year. A similar pattern also arises around seasoned equity offerings and stock-financed ac-
quisitions, but is absent from debt issues and cash-financed acquisitions. Further evidence suggests
that this inverted-V-shaped pattern is most consistent with managers’ opportunistically adjusting
advertising to the benefit of their own and that of their existing shareholders.
More broadly, the findings in this paper imply that some important firm decisions may be, in
part, motivated by short-term stock price considerations. While I highlight one particular channel
in this paper, there are likely to be others. A potentially interesting direction for future research
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is to identify similar opportunistic behavior in other aspects of firm operations that also have
short-term stock return implications.
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Table I: Summary Statistics 
 
This table reports summary statistics of the sample that spans the period 1974 to 2010. Panel A: This panel 
is the summary of firms with missing and non-missing advertising spending data. Data on advertising 
spending (data45), total assets (data6), equity (data216), annual sales (data12), income (data18), and firm 
age are obtained from COMPUSTAT annual files. The COMPUSTAT sample is then merged with CRSP 
monthly stock files to obtain market capitalization. To reduce the impact of outliers, the following 
variables: the market-to-book ratio, advertising spending to sales ratio, advertising spending to assets ratio, 
and annual growth in advertising spending, are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. To further ensure 
data quality, the first two years of financial data of each firm from COMPUSTAT are excluded from the 
sample. Panel B: This panel contains the summary for various corporate events, including insider selling, 
restricted shares vesting, equity issues, debt issues, and stock- and cash-financed acquisitions (only acquirers 
are considered). Insider sales (restricted shares vesting) are defined as the aggregate number of shares sold 
(vested) across all top executives over a year scaled by the shares outstanding. Equity issues, debt issues, 
and stock and cash-financed acquisitions are defined as the total principal amount involved in these 
transactions over a year divided by the market capitalization of the firm. All variables in panel B are 
winsorized at the 99th percentile.  
 
Panel A: Advertising Spending (1974 — 2010) 
 Firms with AD spending Firms missing AD spending 
Firm Characteristics Mean Median Stdev Mean Median Stdev 
Market Cap (Million $) 1784 93 10975 1170 95 7986 
Total Assets (Million $) 3034 163 33884 2828 133 27028 
Sales (Million $) 1480 120 8120 1102 109 5733 
Net Earnings (Million $) 76.58 3.73 799.46 57.45 3.33 553.52 
Firm Age 15.31 12.00 11.85 15.57 12.00 12.29 
Market to Book 2.48 1.52 3.42 2.65 1.46 3.91 
Advertising (Million $) 42.09 2.16 219.14 
AD to Sales ratio 4.33% 2.06% 7.33% 
AD to Assets ratio 4.73% 2.27% 7.27% 
% Growth in AD 27.56% 10.16% 84.23% 
No Obs 66,113 122,370 
 
 
Panel B: Various Corporate Events 
 
From Obs All Obs
with AD 
Mean Median Stdev 
Insider sales and restricted shares vesting 
Insider sales 1986 9,005 45,034 1.22% 0.48% 2.21% 
Restricted shares vesting 2006 2,170 9,275 0.20% 0.10% 0.27% 
Other corporate events 
Equity issues 1974 3,458 66,113 17.74% 13.50% 17.86% 
Debt issues 1974 4,979 66,113 26.47% 15.74% 35.02% 
Stock-financed acquisitions 1980 490 55,689 36.07% 16.41% 45.73% 
Cash-financed acquisitions 1980 2,869 55,689 12.53% 7.30% 14.13% 
 
 
Table II: Calendar-Time Portfolio Returns 
 
This table shows calendar-time equal-weighted monthly returns to portfolios sorted by changes in log advertising spending (߂ܣܦ). Panel A: Portfolios 
are ranked by changes in advertising spending in the previous fiscal year, and are rebalanced every month using the most recent advertising spending 
data. The portfolios are then held for two years. Panels B: Portfolios are sorted by industry-adjusted changes in advertising spending from the previous 
fiscal year. Panels C and D: These two panels report subsample analyses, where portfolios are ranked by changes in advertising spending in the 
previous fiscal year. Years 1994 and 1995 are excluded from the analysis due to a regulatory change on the reporting of advertising expenditures 
introduced in 1994. To deal with overlapping portfolios in each holding month, the equal-weighted average return across portfolios formed in different 
months is reported (as Jegadeesh and Titman (1993)). A number of risk benchmarks are employed here: the Fama-French three-factor model, the 
Carhart four-factor model, and the Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman and Wermers (2006, DGTW) characteristics-adjustment model. T-statistics, shown in 
parentheses, are computed based on standard errors corrected for serial-dependence with 12 lags. 5% statistical significance is indicated in bold. 
 
 


















 Year 0, the formation year Year 1 after portfolio formation Year 2 after portfolio formation 
Panel A: Sort by Δܣܦ, 1974-2010 
1 -0.13% -0.49% -0.39% -0.31% 0.79% -0.07% 0.31% 0.10% 1.18% 0.31% 0.43% 0.22% 
10 0.94% 0.72% 0.57% 0.56% 0.20% -0.56% -0.17% -0.34% 0.36% -0.40% -0.14% -0.39% 
10 - 1 1.07% 1.21% 0.96% 0.87% -0.58% -0.49% -0.48% -0.44% -0.82% -0.71% -0.57% -0.62% 
(6.72) (8.72) (6.99) (5.50) (-3.54) (-3.24) (-3.07) (-3.13) (-4.52) (-3.88) (-2.88) (-3.70) 
 
Panel B: Sort by industry-adjusted Δܣܦ, 1974-2010 
1 0.15% -0.39% -0.36% -0.36% 0.72% -0.09% 0.32% 0.01% 1.26% 0.46% 0.55% 0.31% 
10 0.99% 0.56% 0.52% 0.41% 0.16% -0.61% -0.27% -0.40% 0.38% -0.42% -0.29% -0.40% 
10 - 1 0.84% 0.95% 0.88% 0.77% -0.56% -0.52% -0.59% -0.41% -0.88% -0.88% -0.84% -0.71% 

























 Year 0, the formation year Year 1 after portfolio formation Year 2 after portfolio formation 
Panel C: Sort by Δܣܦ, 1974-1993 
1 0.01% -0.39% -0.40% -0.38% 0.65% -0.03% 0.26% 0.02% 1.00% 0.28% 0.47% 0.14% 
10 1.21% 0.90% 0.73% 0.59% 0.05% -0.66% -0.42% -0.43% 0.07% -0.57% -0.25% -0.57% 
10 - 1 1.20% 1.29% 1.13% 0.97% -0.60% -0.62% -0.68% -0.46% -0.93% -0.85% -0.71% -0.71% 
(5.92) (7.23) (6.22) (5.14) (-3.04) (-3.19) (-3.28) (-2.76) (-4.86) (-4.60) (-3.86) (-3.94) 
 
Panel D: Sort by Δܣܦ, 1996-2010 
1 -0.16% -0.47% -0.38% -0.32% 0.86% -0.08% 0.32% 0.06% 1.32% 0.43% 0.43% 0.24% 
10 0.72% 0.50% 0.40% 0.38% 0.31% -0.50% -0.08% -0.34% 0.57% -0.21% -0.11% -0.40% 
10 - 1 0.89% 0.97% 0.78% 0.70% -0.55% -0.43% -0.40% -0.41% -0.77% -0.64% -0.54% -0.64% 
(4.37) (5.21) (4.48) (3.38) (-2.44) (-2.25) (-2.10) (-2.38) (-2.46) (-2.37) (-2.22) (-2.30) 
 
 
Table III: Fama-MacBeth Return Regressions 
 
This table reports forecasting regressions of stock returns on changes in advertising spending and other 
control variables that are known to predict stock returns. The dependent variable in columns 1 and 2 is the 
monthly stock return in the year following the fiscal year end; in columns 3 and 4, it is the monthly stock 
return in the second year following the fiscal year end; and in columns 5 and 6, it is the monthly stock 
return in months 7 to 18 after the fiscal year end. The independent variable of interest is the change in log 
advertising spending (߂ܣܦ) in the previous fiscal year. ߂ܣܵܵܧܶܵ, ߂ܵܣܮܧܵ, and ߂ܥܣܲܧܺ, are changes in log 
assets, sales, and capital expenditures in the same fiscal year. Other control variables include cumulative 
stock returns at various horizons, firm size, the market-to-book ratio, firm age, aggregate equity issuance in 
the previous four years as defined in Daniel and Titman (2006), discretionary accruals as defined in Xie 
(2001), and average monthly turnover in the previous year. Coefficients are estimated using the Fama-
MacBeth approach. Standard errors, shown in brackets, are corrected for serial-dependence with 12 lags. *, 




returns in year 1 
Monthly stock 
returns in year 2 
Monthly returns in 
year 1 (skip 6 mo) 
(X 100) [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 
߂ܣܦ -0.24*** -0.11** -0.21*** -0.11*** -0.23*** -0.10** 
[0.07] [0.05] [0.05] [0.04] [0.06] [0.04] 
߂ܣܵܵܧܶܵ -0.79*** -1.23*** -1.34*** 
[0.27] [0.23] [0.32] 
߂ܵܣܮܧܵ -0.18 0.26 -0.03 
[0.31] [0.25] [0.30] 
߂ܥܣܲܧܺ -0.08 -0.08 -0.08 
[0.06] [0.07] [0.07] 
Other Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj-R2 0.07 0.09 0.06 0.08 0.06 0.08 







Table IV: Retail Investor Trading 
 
This table reports regressions of monthly small trade imbalances on changes in advertising spending and 
other control variables. The sample period is 1983 to 2000. The starting year of the sample is determined 
by data availability, and the end year by the validity of small orders as a measure of retail trading. The 
dependent variable in columns 1-4 is the number of small buy orders minus the number of small sell orders, 
divided by the total number of small orders in a month. In columns 5-8, it is the dollar volume of small buy 
orders minus that of small sell orders, divided by the total dollar amount of small orders in a month. Small 
orders are defined as those below $5,000 in size. The independent variable of interest is the change in log 
advertising spending (߂ܣܦ). ߂ܣܵܵܧܶܵ, ߂ܵܣܮܧܵ, and ߂ܥܣܲܧܺ, are changes in log assets, sales, and capital 
expenditures in the same fiscal year. Other control variables include cumulative stock returns at various 
horizons, firm size, the market-to-book ratio, firm age, and average monthly turnover in the fiscal year. In 
columns 1, 2, 5, and 6, the small trade imbalance is measured in the same year as ߂ܣܦ, and in columns 3, 
4, 7, and 8, it is measured in the following year. Coefficients are estimated using the Fama-MacBeth 
approach. Standard errors, shown in brackets, are corrected for serial-dependence with 12 lags. *, **, *** 




in year 0 
Monthly ImbNum 
in year 1 
Monthly ImbDol   
in year 0 
Monthly ImbDol   
in year 1 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] 
߂ܣܦ 0.10*** 0.04*** 0.07*** 0.02* 0.08*** 0.04*** 0.06** 0.02* 
[0.01] [0.01] [0.02] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.02] [0.01] 
߂ܣܵܵܧܶܵ 0.20*** 0.20*** 0.16*** 0.17*** 
[0.03] [0.02] [0.03] [0.02] 
߂ܵܣܮܧܵ 0.14*** 0.10*** 0.13*** 0.08*** 
[0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02] 
߂ܥܣܲܧܺ 0.01* 0.01 0.01 0.01 
[0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] 
Other Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj-R2 0.03 0.05 0.03 0.05 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.04 







Table V: Mechanism of the Return Effect 
 
This table reports forecasting regressions of stock returns on changes in advertising spending and other 
control variables. The dependent variable is the monthly stock return in months 7-18 after the fiscal year 
end. The independent variable of interest is the change in log advertising spending (߂ܣܦ) in the previous 
fiscal year. ߂ܣܵܵܧܶܵ, ߂ܵܣܮܧܵ, and ߂ܥܣܲܧܺ, are changes in log assets, sales, and capital expenditures in 
the same fiscal year. Other control variables include cumulative stock returns at various horizons, firm size, 
the market-to-book ratio, firm age, aggregate equity issuance in the previous four years as defined in Daniel 
and Titman (2006), discretionary accruals as defined in Xie (2001), and average monthly turnover in the 
fiscal year. The regressions also include a list of interaction terms between ߂ܣܦ and dummy variables 
(measured contemporaneous to ߂ܣܦ). ܥ݋݊ݏݑ݉݁ݎ	݅݊݀ݑݏݐݎݕ is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 
if the firm operates in a consumer-product industry based on the Fama-French five-industry definition and 
0 otherwise. All the other indicator variables take the value of 1 if the corresponding firm characteristic is 
above the sample median and 0 otherwise. Retail trading is defined as the number of small buy orders 
minus that of small sell orders, divided by the total number of small orders in the previous year. #	ܾݎܽ݊݀ݏ 
is the number of brands a firm has (as reported by Nielson Media). Analyst coverage, institutional 
ownership, and the number of product brands are then adjusted for firm size. Coefficients are estimated 
using the Fama-MacBeth approach. Standard errors, shown in brackets, are corrected for serial-dependence 
with 12 lags. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 90%, 95%, and 99% level, respectively. 
 
Monthly stock returns in year 1 (skip 6 months) 
(X 100) [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 
߂ܣܦ -0.08* -0.29** -0.11* -0.05 -0.17** -0.23* 
[0.05] [0.12] [0.07] [0.09] [0.07] [0.12] 
ܦݑ݉݉ݕ 0.16 -0.11 -0.21 -0.20 0.14 -0.19 
 [0.17] [0.15] [0.20] [0.14] [0.17] [0.23] 
       
߂ܣܦ * ܦݑ݉݉ݕ -0.18** 
(Consumer Industry) [0.08] 
߂ܣܦ * ܦݑ݉݉ݕ 0.21*** 
(High Analyst Coverage) [0.07] 
߂ܣܦ * ܦݑ݉݉ݕ -0.25** 
(High Retail Buying) [0.10] 
߂ܣܦ * ܦݑ݉݉ݕ -0.21** 
(High Turnover) [0.08] 
߂ܣܦ * ܦݑ݉݉ݕ 0.10* 
(High Institution Holdings) [0.06] 
߂ܣܦ * ܦݑ݉݉ݕ 0.18** 
(High # Brands) [0.07] 
Other Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj-R2 0.09 0.11 0.12 0.10 0.09 0.06 






Table VI: Advertising Spending around Insider Sales 
 
This table reports analyses of advertising spending around insider sales. The sample period is 1986 to 2010. 
Panel A reports a panel regression. The dependent variable in columns 1 and 2 is the logarithm of 
advertising spending (ܣܦ) in year ݐ, and in column 3, it is the logarithm of the advertising spending to sales 
ratio. The independent variables of interest are three event-related dummies. A year is labelled an event 
year if the amount of insider sales (ܣܯܶ) is above the 25th percentile of the sample distribution, where ܣܯܶ 
is defined as the total number of shares sold by all top-level directors and offices in a year scaled by shares 
outstanding of the firm. ܲݎ݁ܧݒ݁݊ݐ, ܧݒ݁݊ݐ, and ܲ݋ݏݐܧݒ݁݊ݐ are indicator variables, which are equal to 1 if 
the following year, the current year, and the previous year are an event year, respectively, and 0 otherwise. 
ܣܵܵܧܶܵ and ܵܣܮܧܵ are the logarithm of total assets and sales, respectively. Other control variables include 
cumulative stock returns at various horizons, the return volatility, firm size, the market-to-book ratio, firm 
age, average monthly turnover in the fiscal year, and the KZ index. Year fixed effects are included in 
column 1, and both year and firm fixed effects are included in columns 2 and 3. Standard errors, shown in 
brackets, are clustered at the firm level. Panel B reports the differences in changes in log advertising 
spending around event years between the treatment group and matching firms. A matching firm is the one 
with the closet propensity score from the firm in question based on a set of firm characteristics: industry, 
firm size, book-to-market ratio, and past stock returns. Panel C reports a similar regression as in Panel A, 
with three additional independent variables: the actual amount of insider selling in the following 
(ܲݎ݁ܧݒ݁݊ݐ_ܣܯܶ), current (ܧݒ݁݊ݐ_ܣܯܶ), and previous (ܲ݋ݏݐܧݒ݁݊ݐ_ܣܯܶ) years. *, **, *** denote statistical 
significance at the 90%, 95%, and 99% level, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Panel regression of ܣܦ௧ 
  [1] [2] [3] 
ܲݎ݁ܧݒ݁݊ݐ௧ 0.053*** 0.053*** 0.049*** 
  [0.016] [0.018] [0.018] 
ܧݒ݁݊ݐ௧ 0.069*** 0.059*** 0.059*** 
  [0.009] [0.011] [0.011] 
ܲ݋ݏݐܧݒ݁݊ݐ௧ -0.039*** -0.051*** -0.049*** 
  [0.015] [0.018] [0.018] 
ܵܣܮܧܵ௧ିଵ 0.031*** 0.198*** -0.658*** 
[0.004] [0.012] [0.012] 
ܣܵܵܧܶܵ௧ିଵ 0.006 0.496*** 0.397*** 
[0.005] [0.015] [0.015] 
ܣܦ௧ିଵ 0.940*** 
[0.003] 
Other Controls Yes Yes Yes 
    
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Fixed Effects No Yes Yes 
Adj-R2 0.95 0.94 0.80 







Panel B: Propensity score matching 
No Obs Event firms - Matching firms 
ܣܦ௧ െ ܣܦ௧ିଶ 1,041 6.28%** 
ܣܦ௧ െ ܣܦ௧ିଵ 1,041 2.59%* 
ܣܦ௧ െ ܣܦ௧ାଵ 1,041 4.38%** 
ܣܦ௧ െ ܣܦ௧ାଶ 1,041 9.83%*** 
 
 
Panel C: Panel regression of ܣܦ௧ 
 [1] [2] [3] 
ܲݎ݁ܧݒ݁݊ݐ௧ 0.020 0.029 0.029 
  [0.019] [0.022] [0.022] 
ܧݒ݁݊ݐ௧ 0.019* 0.007 0.007 
  [0.010] [0.013] [0.013] 
ܲ݋ݏݐܧݒ݁݊ݐ௧ -0.028 -0.031 -0.028 
  [0.018] [0.022] [0.021] 
ܲݎ݁ܧݒ݁݊ݐ_ܣܯ ௧ܶ 0.873** 0.524 0.524 
  [0.354] [0.345] [0.335] 
ܧݒ݁݊ݐ_ܣܯ ௧ܶ 0.744*** 0.911*** 0.880*** 
  [0.213] [0.306] [0.300] 
ܲ݋ݏݐܧݒ݁݊ݐ_ܣܯ ௧ܶ -0.634** -1.245** -1.282** 
  [0.270] [0.588] [0.579] 
ܵܣܮܧܵ௧ିଵ 0.030*** 0.198*** -0.658*** 
[0.004] [0.012] [0.012] 
ܣܵܵܧܶܵ௧ିଵ 0.006 0.496*** 0.397*** 
[0.005] [0.015] [0.015] 
ܣܦ௧ିଵ 0.939*** 
[0.003] 
Other Controls Yes Yes Yes 
    
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Fixed Effects No Yes Yes 
Adj-R2 0.95 0.94 0.80 







Table VII: Vesting of Restricted Shares 
 
This table reports advertising spending around insider sales using an instrument-variable approach. 
Columns 1 and 2 report the baseline OLS regression where the dependent variables are the logarithm of 
advertising spending (ܣܦ௧ ) and the logarithm of the advertising spending to sales ratio (ሺܣܦ/ܵܮܵሻ௧ ), 
respectively. Column 3 shows the first stage regression where the dependent variable is a dummy that takes 
the value of one if some insiders sell their shares in year ݐ (ܧݒ݁݊ݐ௧ሻ. Columns 4 and 5 report the two-stage 
least squares regression where the dependent variables are the logarithm of advertising spending (ܣܦ௧) and 
the logarithm of the advertising spending to sales ratio (ሺܣܦ/ܵܮܵሻ௧), respectively. ܸ݁ݏݐ݅݊݃௧ is a dummy 
variable that takes the value of one if some restricted shares vest in year ݐ. ܫ݊ݏݐݎݑ݉݁݊ݐ݁݀	ܧݒ݁݊ݐ௧ is the 
fitted value from the first-stage regression. ܣܵܵܧܶܵ and ܵܣܮܧܵ are the logarithm of total assets and sales, 
respectively. Other control variables include cumulative stock returns at various horizons, the return 
volatility, firm size, the market-to-book ratio, firm age, average monthly turnover, and the KZ index. Both 
year and firm fixed effects are included in all regression specifications. Standard errors, shown in brackets, 
are clustered at the firm level. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 90%, 95%, and 99% level, 
respectively. 
 
2SLS regressions with restricted shares vesting 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
 Baseline OLS 1st Stage 2SLS 
Dependent Variable ܣܦ௧ ሺܣܦ/ܵܮܵሻ௧ ܧݒ݁݊ݐ௧ ܣܦ௧ ሺܣܦ/ܵܮܵሻ௧ 
      
ܧݒ݁݊ݐ௧ 0.048*** 0.049***   
  [0.018] [0.018]   
ܸ݁ݏݐ݅݊݃௧  0.598***   
   [0.160]   
ܫ݊ݏݐݎݑ݉݁݊ݐ݁݀	ܧݒ݁݊ݐ௧  0.058** 0.062** 
   [0.027] [0.029] 
ܵܣܮܧܵ௧ିଵ 0.134* -0.659*** 0.038*** 0.125* -0.705*** 
[0.075] [0.085] [0.006] [0.071] [0.077] 
ܣܵܵܧܶܵ௧ିଵ 0.584*** 0.457*** -0.013** 0.580*** 0.472*** 
[0.066] [0.068] [0.006] [0.064] [0.066] 
Other Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
      
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj-R2 0.94 0.81 0.31 0.94 0.81 




Table VIII: Sensitivity of Future Sales to Advertising Spending 
 
This table reports analyses of the sensitivity of future sales to advertising spending. The sample period is 
1986 to 2010. The dependent variable in all columns is the percentage change in annual sales (߂ܵܣܮܧܵ). 
The independent variable of interest is the lagged percentage change in advertising spending (߂ܣܦ). A year 
is labelled an event year if the amount of insider sales (ܣܯܶ) is above the 25th percentile of the sample 
distribution, where ܣܯܶ is defined as the total number of shares sold by all top-level directors and offices in 
a year scaled by shares outstanding of the firm. ܧݒ݁݊ݐ is an indicator variable, which is equal to 1 if the 
year in question is an event year, and 0 otherwise. ߂ܣܵܵܧܶܵ and ߂ܵܣܮܧܵ are the percentage change in total 
assets and sales, respectively. Other control variables include cumulative stock returns at various horizons, 
the return volatility, firm size, the market-to-book ratio, firm age, average monthly turnover in the fiscal 
year, and the KZ index. Year fixed effects are included in all regression specifications. Standard errors, 
shown in brackets, are clustered at the firm level. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 90%, 95%, 
and 99% level, respectively. 
 
Panel regression of ߂ܵܣܮܧܵ௧ାଵ 
[1] [2] [3] [4] 
߂ܣܦ௧ 0.085*** 0.091*** 0.027*** 0.032*** 
  [0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.006] 
ܧݒ݁݊ݐ௧ -0.063*** -0.069*** 
  [0.006] [0.006] 
߂ܣܦ௧ 	ൈ ܧݒ݁݊ݐ௧ -0.057*** -0.051*** 
  [0.017] [0.017] 
߂ܵܣܮܧܵ௧ 0.115*** 0.116*** 
[0.015] [0.015] 
߂ܣܵܵܧܶܵ௧ 0.262*** 0.262*** 
[0.011] [0.011] 
Other Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Fixed Effects No No No No 
Adj-R2 0.07 0.08 0.20 0.21 







Table IX: Advertising Spending around Sales by Lower-Level Insiders 
 
This table reports analyses of advertising spending around sales by lower-level insiders, as defined by 
Thomson Financial. The sample period is 1986 to 2010.  The dependent variable in columns 1 and 2 is the 
logarithm of advertising spending (ܣܦ) in year ݐ, and in column 3, it is the logarithm of the advertising 
spending to sales ratio. The independent variables of interest are three event-related dummies. A year is 
labelled an event year if the amount of insider sales (ܣܯܶ) is above the 25th percentile of the sample 
distribution, where ܣܯܶ is defined as the total number of shares sold by all lower-level directors and offices 
in year ݐ scaled by shares outstanding of the firm. ܲݎ݁ܧݒ݁݊ݐ, ܧݒ݁݊ݐ, and ܲ݋ݏݐܧݒ݁݊ݐ are indicator variables, 
which are equal to 1 if the following year, the current year, and the previous year are an event year, 
respectively, and 0 otherwise. ܣܵܵܧܶܵ and ܵܣܮܧܵ are the logarithm of total assets and sales, respectively. 
Other control variables include cumulative stock returns at various horizons, the return volatility, firm size, 
the market-to-book ratio, firm age, average monthly turnover in the fiscal year, and the KZ index. Year 
fixed effects are included in column 1, and both year and firm fixed effects are included in columns 2 and 3. 
Standard errors, shown in brackets, are clustered at the firm level. *, **, *** denote statistical significance 
at the 90%, 95%, and 99% level, respectively. 
 
Advertising spending around sales by lower-level insiders 
  [1] [2] [3] 
ܲݎ݁ܧݒ݁݊ݐ௧ 0.021 0.015 0.013 
  [0.015] [0.019] [0.019] 
ܧݒ݁݊ݐ௧ 0.019* 0.018 0.020 
  [0.010] [0.012] [0.012] 
ܲ݋ݏݐܧݒ݁݊ݐ௧ -0.021 -0.019 -0.014 
  [0.018] [0.021] [0.021] 
ܵܣܮܧܵ௧ିଵ 0.048*** 0.176*** -0.677*** 
[0.006] [0.028] [0.026] 
ܣܵܵܧܶܵ௧ିଵ 0.007 0.486*** 0.386*** 
[0.004] [0.032] [0.031] 
ܣܦ௧ିଵ 0.923*** 
[0.004] 
Other Controls Yes Yes Yes 
    
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Fixed Effects No Yes Yes 
Adj-R2 0.94 0.94 0.79 






Table X: Other Corporate Events 
 
This table reports analyses of advertising spending around various corporate events: equity and debt issues 
in Panel A, and stock- and cash-financed acquisitions in Panel B (only acquirers are considered). The 
sample period of Panel A is 1974 to 2010 and that in Panel B is 1980 to 2010. The dependent variable in all 
columns of both panels is the logarithm of advertising spending (ܣܦ) in year ݐ. The independent variables 
of interest are three event-related dummies. A year is labelled an event year if there is at least one 
transaction of the particular type under consideration. In Panel A, ܣܯܶ is defined as the total proceeds 
from equity issues (columns 1 and 2) and debt issues (columns 3 and 4) in year ݐ scaled by the market 
capitalization of the firm. In Panel B, ܣܯܶ is defined as the total transaction value of stock-financed 
acquisitions (columns 1 and 2) and cash-financed acquisitions (columns 3 and 4) in year ݐ scaled by the 
market capitalization of the firm. ܲݎ݁ܧݒ݁݊ݐ, ܧݒ݁݊ݐ, and ܲ݋ݏݐܧݒ݁݊ݐ are indicator variables, which are equal 
to 1 if the following year, the current year, and the previous year are an event year, respectively, and 0 
otherwise. ܲݎ݁ܧݒ݁݊ݐ_ܣܯܶ, ܧݒ݁݊ݐ_ܣܯܶ, and ܲ݋ݏݐܧݒ݁݊ݐ_ܣܯܶ are the actual ܣܯܶ in the following, current, 
and previous years, respectively. ܣܵܵܧܶܵ  and ܵܣܮܧܵ  are the logarithm of total assets and sales, 
respectively. Other control variables include cumulative stock returns at various horizons, the return 
volatility, firm size, the market-to-book ratio, firm age, average monthly turnover in the fiscal year, and the 
KZ index. Both year and firm fixed effects are included in all columns. Standard errors, shown in brackets, 
are clustered at the firm level. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 90%, 95%, and 99% level, 
respectively. 
 
Panel A: Advertising spending around equity issues and debt issues 
[1] [2] [3] [4] 
ܲݎ݁ܧݒ݁݊ݐ௧ 0.038** 0.019 0.012 0.004 
  [0.017] [0.023] [0.016] [0.020] 
ܧݒ݁݊ݐ௧ 0.077*** 0.041** 0.025 0.016 
  [0.014] [0.019] [0.017] [0.015] 
ܲ݋ݏݐܧݒ݁݊ݐ௧ 0.008 0.021 0.023 0.027 
  [0.015] [0.021] [0.014] [0.018] 
ܲݎ݁ܧݒ݁݊ݐ_ܣܯ ௧ܶ 0.205** 0.032 
  [0.100] [0.047] 
ܧݒ݁݊ݐ_ܣܯ ௧ܶ 0.330*** 0.033 
  [0.080] [0.036] 
ܲ݋ݏݐܧݒ݁݊ݐ_ܣܯ ௧ܶ -0.160* -0.015 
  [0.083] [0.041] 
ܵܣܮܧܵ௧ିଵ 0.266*** 0.266*** 0.296*** 0.296*** 
[0.012] [0.012] [0.013] [0.013] 
ܣܵܵܧܶܵ௧ିଵ 0.457*** 0.457*** 0.402*** 0.403*** 
[0.015] [0.015] [0.015] [0.015] 
Other Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj-R2 0.95 0.95 0.94 0.94 







Panel B: Advertising spending around stock- and cash-financed mergers 
[1] [2] [3] [4] 
ܲݎ݁ܧݒ݁݊ݐ௧ 0.037 0.017 0.003 0.009 
  [0.050] [0.062] [0.019] [0.025] 
ܧݒ݁݊ݐ௧ 0.140*** 0.098* -0.017 -0.030 
  [0.042] [0.052] [0.016] [0.020] 
ܲ݋ݏݐܧݒ݁݊ݐ௧ 0.025 0.023 0.014 0.024 
  [0.044] [0.056] [0.020] [0.026] 
ܲݎ݁ܧݒ݁݊ݐ_ܣܯ ௧ܶ 0.048 -0.047 
  [0.051] [0.126] 
ܧݒ݁݊ݐ_ܣܯ ௧ܶ 0.104** 0.104 
  [0.053] [0.092] 
ܲ݋ݏݐܧݒ݁݊ݐ_ܣܯ ௧ܶ 0.003 -0.069 
  [0.042] [0.125] 
ܵܣܮܧܵ௧ିଵ 0.208*** 0.208*** 0.274*** 0.274*** 
[0.030] [0.030] [0.017] [0.017] 
ܣܵܵܧܶܵ௧ିଵ 0.414*** 0.412*** 0.447*** 0.447*** 
[0.040] [0.040] [0.021] [0.021] 
Other Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj-R2 0.94 0.94 0.96 0.96 










Figure 1: Sensitivity of Future Sales to Advertising Spending 
 
This figure shows the sensitivity of sales growth to lagged changes in advertising spending. The blue line 
with diamonds shows the effect of a one-standard-deviation increase in insider sales on future sales growth 
in periods without insider sales, while the red line with squares shows the same effect for periods with 
insider sales. 
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